Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Harrold v. Colvin

United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma

February 16, 2017

DONA MARIE HARROLD, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

          OPINION AND ORDER

         Plaintiff, Dona Marie Harrold (“Harrold”), seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.

         Social Security Law and Standard of Review

         Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Act only if his “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.[1] See also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (detailing steps). “If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.” Lax, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted).

         Judicial review of the Commissioner's determination is limited in scope to two inquiries: first, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and, second, whether the correct legal standards were applied. Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004).

         “Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quotation and citation omitted). Although the court will not reweigh the evidence, the court will “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Id.

         Background

         Harrold was forty years old on the alleged date of onset of disability and forty-four on the date of the Commissioner's final decision. [R. 1, R. 252 (Ex. 1D)]. She has a high school education and one year of college. [R.107]. She has previous experience as a build specialist at a pipeline manufacturing company, convenience store manager, master inspector at a television station and salesperson at a radio station. [R. 282 (Ex. 2E)]. In her application, she claimed to be unable to work as a result of severe migraines, bipolar disorder, anxiety, lower back problems and fibromyalgia. [R. 281(Ex. 2E)].

         The ALJ's Decision

         In his decision, the ALJ found that Harrold met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2016, and, at Step One, that she had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since June 11, 2012, the alleged onset date. [R. 89]. He found at Step Two that Harrold had severe impairments of bipolar I disorder, mixed with psychotic features; panic disorder with agoraphobia; mild degenerative changes of both knees; C4-C5 disc bilobed herniation with cord contact; mild degenerative cervical changes; and mild to moderate diffuse degenerative changes to the thoracic spine. Id. At Step Three, he found that the impairments did not meet or medically equal any listing. [R. 90]. He concluded that Harrold the following residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform “light” and “sedentary” work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). She could occasionally lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds and could frequently lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds. She could stand and/or walk for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. She could sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. She could use her hands for hand controls and her feet for foot controls. She has no postural limitation and no vision limits. She has no environmental limitations. She could understand, remember and carry out simple tasks. She could relate to others on a superficial work basis. She could adapt appropriately to a work situation. She could not work with the general public. She has mild to moderate to occasional chronic pain of sufficient severity so as to be noticeable, yet is able to remain attentive and responsive in a work setting. She takes medications but is able to remain reasonably alert to perform required functions in the work setting.

[R. 91].

         At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Harrold was unable to perform any past relevant work. [R. 94]. At Step Five, he found that, considering Harrold's age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, including laundry sorter, light unskilled work with an SVP of 2, DOT #361.687-014, with 12, 000 such jobs in Region 6 and 177, 000 such jobs in the national economy; mail room clerk, light unskilled work with an SVP of 2, DOT #209.687-026, with 16, 000 such jobs in Region 6 and 205, 000 such jobs in the national economy; assembler, light unskilled work with an SVP of 2, DOT #706.684-022, with 13, 000 such jobs in Region 6 and 180, 000 such jobs in the national economy; clerical mailer, sedentary unskilled work with an SVP of 2, DOT #209.587-010, with 10, 500 such jobs in Region 6 and 125, 000 such jobs in the national economy; assembler, sedentary unskilled work with an SVP of 2, DOT #726.685-066, with 7, 000 such jobs in Region 6 and 93, 000 such jobs in the national economy; and surveillance monitor, sedentary unskilled work with an SVP of 2, DOT #379.367-010, with 4, 000 such jobs in Region 6 and 72, 000 such jobs in the national economy. [R. 95].

         Accordingly, the ALJ found that Harrold had not been under a disability from June 11, 2012, through the date of the decision. [R. 96].

         Plaintiff's ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.