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United States v. Hudson
United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
February 21, 2017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
CHAD NATHAN HUDSON, a/k/a CP, a/k/a Pimp, a/k/a Big Homie, JASMINE RENEE EDWARDS, a/k/a Jasmine Edwards, TYRON LANCE BAKER, a/k/a Tyrone Lance Baker, RANDY LYNN NICHOLS, RICHARD JOSEPH COKER, a/k/a Lucky, CHRISTOPHER PAUL BROWN, a/k/a CB, a/k/a Breezy, RICHARD LEE POTTS, a/k/a Pothead, DAVID DEAN CAGLE, GARY HOLDEN SCHNEIDER, a/k/a Red Fein, a/k/a Red Fang, TENESIA DIANE RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Tenesia Rosenke, a/k/a Teneshia Diane Dickerson, a/k/a Damian Rosenke, a/k/a Tenesia D. Damian, a/k/a T, AISHA BLISS DONALDSON, RICKY LYNN WOLFE, DEVON ALAN HERRON, ZANE P. YARGEE, DARYL LLOYD IVEY, a/k/a Steve-O, DEREK THOMAS SOETEN, a/k/a D-Lo, NIKE DEANDRE DAVIS, a/k/a Lavish, MARGIE LEE BARNHILL, AMANDA HEATHER HOLLAND, JEREMY ANTOWAINE TAYLOR, a/k/a JT, EYNER MORA ESPARZA, ROBHINSON RENE GARCIA AGUIRRE, JEFFREY LEE WHITMIRE, a/k/a J Dub, SAVANNAH DAWN GUTHERY, a/k/a Missy, MELISSA DAWN COOPER, a/k/a MC, AMANDA DONNA LOUISE BENTON, a/k/a Mandy Krouse, CIARA RAIN DICKERSON, a/k/a Ciara Coddington, and TAKELIA CHAKE TROUPE, Defendants.
L. RUSSELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Zane Yargee filed a Second Motion to Extend Time to File
Motions and Continuing Date for Jury Trial (Doc. No. 682).
The motion is joined by all remaining defendants, except
Daryl Lloyd Ivey, Devon Herron, and Melissa Dawn Cooper. The
Court has contacted counsel for Defendant Herron who notes he
has no objection to the request. Defendant Cooper has not
been arrested and thus is unaffected by this motion.
Defendant Ivey filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion.
(Doc. No. 692). The motion is not opposed by the Government.
case originated on June 22, 2016, when the grand jury
returned an indictment charging four defendants with seven
counts. Through the filing of complaints, superseding and
second superseding indictments, the case grew to a total of
twenty-eight defendants and one hundred and fourteen counts.
As of this date, sixteen of the twenty-eight defendants have
entered pleas of guilty either to a superseding information
or to charges for which they were indicted. On October 12,
2016, in light of the number of the Defendants and the number
of counts alleged by the United States as of that date, the
Court declared the case to be complex and granted the motion
of Defendant Yargee to extend the time for the filing of
motions and continued the matter to the Court's April
trial docket. (Doc. No. 411). The Court noted the enormous
volume of discovery produced and yet-to-be produced by the
United States, as well as the number of counts and the
complex conspiracy alleged to exist amongst certain of the
Defendants, concluding that an "end-of-justice"
continuance was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).
December 23, 2016, the United States filed a Motion to
Continue the trial from the Court's April 2016 docket to
the September 2017 docket. (Doc. No. 526). The Court granted
the motion on January 1, 2017. (Doc. No. 547). Mr. Ivey
objected to the request, although he did not file a formal
opposition thereto. Id. The Court noted the
voluminous discovery and the changing landscape of the claim
by virtue of superseding indictments and the potential for
additional superseding indictments. On January 18, 2017, the
grand jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment. (Doc.
No. 601). Thereafter the instant motion and objection were
As designed and written, the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161, et seq., serves two important interests:
protecting a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
a speedy trial and serving the public interest in prompt
criminal proceedings. United States v. Thompson, 524
F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir.2008). "The Act generally
requires a federal criminal trial to begin within seventy
days from the filing of an information or indictment, or from
the date of the defendant's initial appearance, whichever
occurs later." United States v. Williams, 511
F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir.2007) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3161(c)(1)). Because "criminal cases vary widely and ...
there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular
cases, " the Act offers "flexibility" by
including "a long and detailed list of periods of delay
that are excluded in computing the time within which trial
must start." Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S.
489, 497, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006).
United States v. Martino, 564 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1271
(D. Kan. 2008). The Act treats as excludable delays
"attributable to one defendants ... [as] attributable to
all co-defendants." United States v. Mobile
Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 902, 915 (10th Cir.
1989). As such, § 3161(h)(7) excludes "[a]
reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has
not run and no motion for severance has been granted."
The basis for this exclusion is the efficient use of
resources, both of the prosecution and the judicial system.
In his objection defendant Ivey merely notes he has objected
to continuances and wishes to go to trial as soon as
Court considers three factors in assessing whether delay
occasioned by a co-defendant is reasonable: (1) whether
Defendant is free on bond, (2) whether Defendant zealously
pursued a speedy trial, and (3) whether the circumstances
further the purpose behind the exclusion to "accommodate
the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources in
trying multiple defendants in a single trial."
United States v. Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1061-62
(10th Cir. 1995). Although Defendant is not on
bond, he was being detained in the Oklahoma County Detention
Center when he was arraigned in this Court, apparently on
what appear to be charges related to this case, which have
since been dismissed. Defendant has repeatedly pursued a
speedy trial, objecting to each request for continuance,
although he has not filed a motion for severance. Finally,
the circumstances herein make a single trial of the
Defendants the most efficient use of both prosecution and
judicial resources. In light of the allegations of conspiracy
allegations, the Court concludes it is likely the United
States will rely on a single group of witnesses. Presumably,
many of those witnesses will have been co-defendants who have
agreed to cooperate with the Government. Furthermore, it does
not appear that the United States has not been diligent in
providing discovery to the Defendants. The Court finds that
the Defendants' request for continuances will not result
in unreasonable delay as to warrant denial of the instant
the Speedy Trial Act grants the Court flexibility by
ends-of-justice continuances. The Court has reconsidered the
factors set forth in § 3161(h(8)(A) and concludes that
any delay resulting from additional continuance of this
matter serves the sends of justice, and that continuance
outweighs the best interest of the public and Defendant Ivey,
and the moving Defendants, in a speedy trial. The United
States has informed Defendants that discovery will be
forthcoming that exceeds 100 Gigabytes of phone data.
Additionally, there will be data from pole cams and aerial
surveillance videos. This is in addition to police reports,
recorded interviews and witness statements. The United States
informed Defendants that more than 55, 000 additional pages
of discovery will be released shortly. Furthermore, rough
transcripts of Title III recordings have just become
available to Defendants. The release of additional discovery
makes the filing of motions under the current timeline
difficult. The Court anticipates a substantial motion
practice by counsel once they have had an opportunity to
review the Government's discovery. The need for the
additional time is self-evident if defense counsel are to
render the type of representation expected, and the Court
concludes the additional time requested is excludable time.
To conclude the time was not excludable would place
Defendants in the untenable position of having to file
motions without full knowledge of the evidence against
possessed by the United States. The Court finds the need for
the proper preparation of the diverse defenses in this
complex case outweighs the public or individual right to a
speedy trial all as set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§3161(h)(7)(B)(i-iv). Thus, the granting of this motion
would be in the interests of substantial justice and is fully
appropriate in the circumstances.
the trial settings for September 11, 2017, are hereby
stricken, as are the deadlines for filing motions under the
current scheduling Order. Trial in this action shall commence
on February 12, 2018. Counsel for the Government and the
defendants will confer and present a new agreed proposed