United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
CHARLES B. ANDERSON JR., Plaintiff,
LIEUTENANT FALSTED et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHARLES B. GOODWIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Charles Anderson Jr., a federal prisoner appearing pro se and
proceeding in forma pauperis, filed this
Bivens action seeking monetary relief against eleven
officials at Federal Correctional Institution, El Reno
(“FCI El Reno”). See Compl. (Doc. No. 1)
at 1-14. Chief United States District Judge Joe
Heaton has referred Plaintiff's case to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned
recommends that Plaintiff's claims against the ten
“John and Jane Doe” Defendants be dismissed on
screening. See 28 U.S.C. §§
Court must screen Plaintiff's Complaint in order to
identify its cognizable claims and to dismiss the pleading,
or any portion thereof, that fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Id. To survive
dismissal a “complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th
Cir. 2007). A claim is facially plausible when the well-pled
factual allegations, accepted as true and viewed in the
plaintiff's favor, “allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged” under the governing law.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679; see Burnett v.
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231,
1236 (10th Cir. 2013).
se plaintiff's complaint is “construed liberally
and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, ” so that any potentially valid
claim can be fairly decided on its merits. Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Still, a
pro se plaintiff must allege “facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based, ” id.,
and district courts should not “construct . . . claims
or grounds [for] relief” not fairly presented in the
complaint, Windsor v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 9 F.
App'x 967, 970 (10th Cir. 2001). Courts also “are
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation” or to “unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79
(internal quotation marks omitted).
ALLEGATIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
action challenges the conditions of Plaintiff's
confinement-specifically, a known threat to Plaintiff's
personal safety and injuries that Plaintiff suffered when he
was physically assaulted by other inmates-while he was
incarcerated at FCI El Reno. See Compl. at 1, 9-12.
In Count I, Plaintiff describes his conversation with
Defendant Lieutenant Falsted, as well as Defendant
Falsted's response to Plaintiff's request for
protective housing, shortly before Plaintiff was attacked on
May 19, 2015. See Id. at 9-11. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Falsted was a “Correctional
Supervisor” employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) and assigned to FCI El Reno. Id.
at 7. In Count II, Plaintiff purports to “incorporate
. . . by reference” the allegations against Defendant
Falsted and bring these allegations against “Defendants
John and Jane Does 1-10.” See Id. at 2, 12.
Plaintiff states that these ten “unknown”
individuals were BOP employees “assigned to the FCI El
Reno in one or more of the following capacities: Correctional
Officers, Correctional Supervisors, Executive and/or
responsible Administrative Staff.” Id. at 8.
before dinnertime on May 19, 2015, Plaintiff went to
Lieutenant Falsted's office to report that Plaintiff
“needed to be placed in Administrative Segregation
Housing” because he “had been told he was going
to be attacked with weapons by fellow Native American
inmates.” Id. at 9. Lieutenant Falsted asked
Plaintiff why he believed he “was the target of an
impending attack.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that
he told Lieutenant Falsted about three “specific
threats to his safety” from different racial or ethnic
groups in FCI El Reno's general population, which is
where Plaintiff was housed at the time. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff said that he had ran out of the money he was using
to settle “old drug debts of fellow Native Americans to
the Mexican Mafia . . . in an effort to maintain peace
between” those two groups. Id. at 9. Second,
Plaintiff said that he had “testif[ied] as a defense
witness” for two Aryan Brotherhood members and that the
Mexican Mafia had passed that information along to
“various members and ‘Shot Callers' of
African-American gangs” such as the “Crips,
Bloods, and Gangster Di[s]ciples.” Id. at
9-10. Finally, Plaintiff said that he had been warned
“that he had to leave” general population
“or get ‘stuck up'” because there was a
rumor going around that Plaintiff “had assisted the
government during the trial and prosecution of members of the
Aryan Brotherhood.” Id. at 9. According to
Plaintiff, “mandatory applicable BOP policies”
required Defendant Falsted, upon receiving this information,
to “immediately place Plaintiff into Administrative
Segregation Housing pending the completion of a Threat
Assessment Investigation.” Id. at 10-11.
Falsted told Plaintiff to wait on a bench outside his office.
Id. at 10. Around the same time, two Native American
inmates approached Plaintiff and told him that “he was
not going to be attacked by anyone.” Id.
Lieutenant Falsted apparently overheard the other
inmates' comment and “ordered [P]laintiff to return
to his housing unit.” Id. Plaintiff did as he
was told. See Id. “Within five minutes of
[P]laintiff's return to his housing unit, he was
physically assaulted with weapons by Native American
inmates.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff suffered
“serious injuries” requiring treatment at a local
does not allege any facts describing what, if anything, the
ten “John and Jane Doe” employees knew about the
threats to Plaintiff's safety before he was attacked.
See Id. at 12. Instead, Plaintiff purports to
“incorporate . . . by reference” the portions
of his Complaint in which he describes Defendant
Falsted's misconduct, and he concludes that the John and
Jane Doe Defendants' “individual and/or collective
acts and omissions” violated the Eighth Amendment.
seeks monetary damages against each Defendant in his or her