United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
OPINION AND ORDER
H. McCARTHY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HAROLD RAY TROUTMAN, seeks judicial review of a decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
denying disability benefits. In accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(1) & (3), the parties have consented to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge.
role of the court in reviewing the decision of the
Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to a
determination of whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence and whether the decision contains a
sufficient basis to determine that the Commissioner has
applied the correct legal standards. See Briggs ex rel.
Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir.
2001); Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir.
1996); Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance,
and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28
L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court may neither
reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of
the Commissioner. Casias v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 993 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Even
if the court would have reached a different conclusion, if
supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's
decision stands. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1992).
was 56 years old on the alleged date of onset of disability
and 58 on the date of the denial decision. Plaintiff has a
high school education and completed two years of college. His
past work experience includes work as a
handyman. Plaintiff claims to have become disabled
as of December 5, 2013 due to ruptured disk in neck,
herniated disk in lower back, ankle problems, knee problems,
and Hepatitis C. [R. 185].
found that Plaintiff has severe impairments relating to
degenerative joint disease of the knees; arthralgias of the
spine and ankles; and obesity. [R. 18]. The ALJ determined
that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work in that he can lift/carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk for 6 hours
out of an 8-hour workday; and sit for 6 hours out of an
8-hour workday. [R. 19]. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff is
unable to perform any past relevant work, but found based on
the testimony of the vocational expert, there are a
significant number of jobs in the national economy that
Plaintiff could perform. [R. 25, 26]. Accordingly, the ALJ
found Plaintiff was not disabled. The case was thus decided
at step five of the five-step evaluative sequence for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. See Williams
v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)
(discussing five steps in detail).
asserts that the ALJ's findings at step five of the
sequential evaluation process were not supported by
substantial evidence. [Dkt. 15');">15');">15');">15, p. 3].
argues that the ALJ erred in finding he possessed
transferable contract negotiation skills from his past
relevant work as a handyman. Further, that Plaintiff could
work as a general building contractor with only the
transferable skills of contract negotiation and cost
estimation. [Dkt. 15');">15');">15');">15, p. 4]. The claimant is considered to
have transferable skills when skilled or semi-skilled work
activities the claimant did in past work can be used ...