KATIE L. BOWERS, Petitioner/Appellee,
MATTHEW A. FLICK, Defendant/Appellant.
Mandate Issued: 10/18/2017
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA HONORABLE
SARAH SMITH, TRIAL JUDGE
Gregory J. Denney, Simon J. Harwood, GREG DENNEY LAW, PLLC,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner/Appellee,
P. Funderburk, FUNDERBURK AND ASSOCIATES P.L.L.C., Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant.
JACK GOREE, PRESIDING JUDGE
Matthew Flick, Defendant/Appellant, appeals the trial
court's issuance of a five-year final protective order
issued against him on January 20, 2016, in favor of Katie L.
Bowers, Petitioner/Appellee. The issue presented on appeal is
whether the district court erred when it granted a five-year
protective order after an emergency order had already been in
effect for one year and the review hearing revealed
violations of the order.
Proceedings under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Curry v.
Streater, 2009 OK 5, ¶8, 213 P.3d 550, 554. To
reverse under this standard, this Court must find that the
trial court's conclusions and judgment were clearly
erroneous, against reason and evidence. Id. We do
not re-weigh the evidence. Id. at ¶17.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. Spielmann v. Hayes ex rel.
Hayes, 2000 OK CIV APP 44, ¶8, 3 P.3d 711, 713.
Appellate courts have "plenary, independent, and
non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's
legal rulings." Id. (citing Neil
Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Wingrod Investment Corp., 1996 OK
125, ¶4, 932 P.2d 1100, 1103 n.1).
Katie Bowers ("Bowers"), Petitioner/Appellee, filed
a Petition for an Emergency Protective Order
("Petition") against Matthew Flick
("Flick"), Defendant/Appellant, on January 5, 2015.
Bowers requested an Emergency Ex Parte Order pursuant to 22
O.S.2011 §60.3 (amended by Laws 2016, c. 183, §5,
eff. Nov. 1, 2016) to protect her from immediate and present
danger. The trial court granted an Emergency Ex Parte Order
of Protection ("Ex Parte Order") that same day and
set the hearing for January 20, 2015, in compliance with 22
O.S.Supp.2013 §60.4 (B)(1) (amended by Laws 2017, c.
173, §1, eff. Nov. 1, 2017).  The Ex Parte Order states
that it "shall remain in effect until after the full
hearing is conducted."
Both parties were present at the full hearing on January 20,
2015, when the trial court entered an order continuing its
previous order ("Continued Order") and set a review
hearing for January 20, 2016. The Continued Order states that
the protective order will be dismissed if there are no
violations. This order is on the same form as the Ex Parte
Order and states that it shall remain in effect until after
the full hearing is conducted. This order also states that it
may become a final protective order if defendant fails to
appear at the hearing. A warning on the last page of the
order states, "A Final Protective Order, granted after
notice and hearing, will be in effect for five (5) years
unless extended, modified, vacated or rescinded by the
court." The record on appeal does not include a
transcript of the hearing that resulted in the Continued
Bowers, pro se, and Flick, with counsel, both appeared at the
"review hearing" on January 20, 2016, where the
trial court entered a five-year Final Order of Protection
("Final Order") pursuant to §60.4(G)(1)(a).
The Final Order states, "This Final Protective Order
shall remain in effect until 1/20/2021 or for a period not to
exceed five years from the date of issue, unless extended,
modified or rescinded by the Court upon Motion or
agreement." This order also states, "The order will
be in effect for a maximum of five (5) years unless extended,
modified, vacated or rescinded by the court."
The transcript from the January 20, 2016, hearing indicates
that the hearing was "a review of a continued emergency
protective order that was continued from... January 20th of
2015 to January 20 of 2016." Flick argues that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling after a full
hearing and a one-year order of protection a year earlier.
Flick asks this Court to reverse the trial court's