United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
STEVEN M. COLEMAN, Plaintiff,
DONALD WILLIAM REED, and SUNWEST MUD COMPANY, INC., Defendants. and CHEROKEE INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Freestates Trucking, LLC, Intervenor Plaintiff, AND DONALD WILLIAM REED, Third-Party Plaintiff,
STEVEN M. COLEMAN, Counter-Defendant, and UNIVERSAL SPECIALIZED, INC., d/b/a ECONOMY TRANSPORT, INC., Third-Party Defendant.
MILES-LAGRANGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is defendants Donald William Reed
(“Reed”) and Sunwest Mud Company, Inc.'s
(“Sunwest Mud”) Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, filed November 1, 2017. On November 17, 2017,
plaintiff Steven M. Coleman (“Coleman”) filed his
response. Based upon the parties' submissions, the Court
makes its determination.
action arises out of a tractor-trailer collision that
occurred on September 20, 2014. Coleman was driving a
tractor-trailer, hauling an oversized windmill tower
midsection; Reed, on behalf of Sunwest Mud, was driving an
unloaded tractor and flatbed trailer. Either Coleman or Reed
crossed the center line, and the tractor-trailers collided.
On September 17, 2015, Coleman filed the instant action. Reed
and Sunwest Mud now move this Court for partial summary
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is appropriate if the record shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving
party is entitled to summary judgment where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party. When applying this standard, [the
Court] examines the record and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechs. v. City of
Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1998)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Furthermore, the non-movant has a burden of
doing more than simply showing there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts. Rather, the relevant inquiry
is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Neustrom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 156 F.3d 1057, 1066
(10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
move this Court for partial summary judgment as to
Coleman's damages for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”) and replacement cost value and as to
Coleman's employment law claims against Sunwest Mud. In
his response, Coleman states that he is withdrawing any
property damage claims previously asserted. Accordingly, the
Court finds defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment as to the replacement cost value damages is now
moot. In his response, Coleman also states that he never
asserted any employment law claims against Sunwest Mud.
Accordingly, the Court finds defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment as to Coleman's employment law
claims is moot.
the only remaining issue is whether defendants are entitled
to summary judgment as to Coleman's damages for PTSD. The
parties agree that under Oklahoma law, there must be a
physical injury suffered before mental anguish injuries can
be asserted. See Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of
Tulsa, Inc., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986). Defendants
assert that Coleman has admitted that he is not making a
claim for personal injury and does not allege any
“physical suffering” connected with the
collision. Defendants further assert that Coleman's
deposition testimony regarding a leg and hip injury from the
collision should not be considered as it is contradicted by
the discovery responses provided by Coleman. Coleman contends
that simply because he is not seeking compensation for his
physical injuries does not mean that he did not suffer an
injury from the collision. Coleman further states that he has
timely supplemented his interrogatory responses to
specifically state that he did suffer physical injuries from
carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Coleman and
viewing all reasonable inferences in Coleman's favor, the
Court finds that there is a disputed issue of material fact
as to whether Coleman suffered a physical injury from the
collision. In his deposition, Coleman specifically testifies
that his leg and hip were injured in the collision.
Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants are not entitled
to summary judgment as to Coleman's damages for PTSD.
reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [docket no. 108].