United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
LEILA LENORE, Individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees and former employees, Plaintiff,
OKLAHOMA BLOOD INSTITUTE, An Oklahoma not for profit corporation, Defendant.
MILES-LaGRANGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January
4, 2018. On January 30, 2018, plaintiff filed her response,
and on February 6, 2018, defendant filed its reply.
December 11, 2017, plaintiff filed the instant action,
alleging that she was not properly compensated for hours
worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of
other similarly situated employees and former employees.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and
12(b)(6), defendant now moves this Court to dismiss
plaintiff's collective action claim and plaintiff's
allegations of willfulness for failure to state a claim.
Specifically, defendant asserts that plaintiff's
collective allegations are conclusory and vague and do not
rise to the standard of plausibility necessary to survive a
motion to dismiss. Defendant also asserts that plaintiff
fails to plead sufficient facts to show a willful violation.
Motion to dismiss standard
the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, the United States Supreme Court
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement, ” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally,
“[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Id. at 678 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). A court “must determine whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements
necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the
legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495
F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Finally, “[a] court reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's
factual allegations are true and construes them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
Collective action claim
contends that plaintiff's FLSA collective action claim
should be dismissed for lack of fair notice of the putative
class. Defendant asserts that plaintiff has not set forth any
express parameters that would define the purported class. In
order to withstand a motion to dismiss a collective action
claim, a plaintiff must give the defendant “fair
notice” of the putative class. See Flores
v. Act Event Servs., Inc., 55 F.Supp.3d 928, 934 (N.D.
Tex. 2014). Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's Amended
Collective Action Complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff
has sufficiently defined her proposed class such that
defendant has “fair notice” of the putative
class. In her complaint, plaintiff defines the proposed class
all current and former Account Consultants, and any other
similarly situated OBI employee/former employee:
a. Who are non-exempt under the FLSA but were wrongfully
classified as exempt;
b. Who were employed by OBI for any time during the period of
time three (3) years before each ...