United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHARLES B. GOODWIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Michael Justin Parkins, a pro se prisoner proceeding in
forma pauperis, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 challenging his arrest by Defendant Guthrie Police
Department. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 2,
United States District Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange then
referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Standard of Review
Court is obligated to conduct an initial review of
Plaintiff's Complaint and dismiss the pleading, or any
portion thereof, if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). A district court may sua
sponte dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted when it is
“patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot
prevail on the facts alleged and amendment of the pleading
would be futile. McKinney v. Okla., Dep't of Human
Servs., 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991); see Kay
v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“We apply the same standard of review for dismissals
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.”).
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted when it lacks factual allegations sufficient
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and
citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are
not entitled to the assumption of truth; “they must be
supported by factual allegations” to state a claim for
relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid
dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a
court's application of “judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. “[A] pro se plaintiff
requires no special legal training to recount the facts
surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such
facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a
claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see
also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th
Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se
pleadings liberally they “will not supply additional
factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's
Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
Complaint identifies the Guthrie Police Department as the
sole Defendant in this action. Liberally construed, Plaintiff
alleges that on or about May 8, 2011, he was arrested by
Defendant on suspicion of having committed lewd or indecent
acts or proposals to a minor. See Compl. at 7. After
being held for eleven months in jail, Plaintiff was acquitted
by a jury on this lewd-molestation criminal charge. See
Id. Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel,
psychological evaluation, compensatory damages, expungement
of his arrest record, and monetary damages “for pain
suffering humiliation, defamation, slander for destroying my
life and my family[']s name/continued verbal abuse
ridicule hate and mistreatment based off of false
Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff invokes the First and Fourteenth Amendments, his
pleading sets forth no facts plausibly implicating the First
Amendment's guarantees of speech, religious exercise, and
conceivably attempts to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection “against deprivations of liberty without due
process of law.” Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d
1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2013). But even assuming Plaintiff had
alleged adequate facts to show Defendant had improperly
obtained an arrest warrant or that Defendant's legal
process was otherwise “unauthorized and thus could not
be anticipated pre-deprivation, ” the Tenth Circuit has
explained that “an adequate post-deprivation
remedy-such as a state tort claim-will satisfy due process
requirements.” Id. “Oklahoma provides an
adequate post-deprivation remedy through a state tort claim
for malicious prosecution.” Parks v. Watts,
No. CIV-14-359-M, 2015 WL 12915678, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 6,
2015) (R. & R.), adopted, 2015 WL 12915679 (W.D.
Okla. Sept. 1, 2015), and aff'd, 641 Fed.Appx.
841 (10th Cir. 2016); accord Alfred v. Alfred, No.
CIV-17-273-C, 2017 WL 4563889, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2017) (R. & R.), adopted, 2017 WL 4563062 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 12, 2017); see also Gutierrez v. Gray,
No. 12-CV-263-JED-TLW, 2014 WL 4924446, at *3 (N.D. Okla.
Sept. 30, 2014) (“Because Oklahoma recognizes a tort
action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff's claims
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
fail.” (citing Greenberg v. Wolfburg, 890 P.2d
895 (Okla. 1994))).
construed, the Complaint also may be attempting to raise a
malicious-prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment.
See Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1082 (10th
Cir. 2017). To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff's continued