United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Lowery (Plaintiff) brings this action for judicial review of
the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision that
he was not “disabled” under the terms of the
Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 423(d)(1)(A). United States District Judge David L.
Russell has referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Doc. 12.
careful review of the record (AR), the parties' briefs,
and the relevant authority, the undersigned recommends the
entry of judgment affirming the Commissioner's final
decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Social Security Act defines “disability” as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). “This twelve-month duration requirement
applies to the claimant's inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity, and not just his underlying
impairment.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080,
1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2002)).
Burden of proof.
“bears the burden of establishing a disability”
and of “ma[king] a prima facie showing that he can no
longer engage in his prior work activity.” Turner
v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1985). If
Plaintiff makes that prima facie showing, the burden of proof
then shifts to the Commissioner to show Plaintiff retains the
capacity to perform a different type of work and that such a
specific type of job exists in the national economy.
Administrative Law Judge's findings.
assigned to Plaintiff's case applied the standard
regulatory analysis in order to decide whether Plaintiff was
disabled during the relevant timeframe. AR 20-21;
see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4); see also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d
1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the five-step
process). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff:
(1) had the severe impairment of “transient cerebral
ischemia status post November 2013 cerebrovascular
(2) had no impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment;
(3) had the residual functional capacity for light work
with various additional restrictions;
(4) was able to perform certain past relevant work (PRW); and
(5) had not been under a disability as defined by the Social
Security Act since his alleged onset date of December 22,