United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
ANJI BRADSHAW, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Nathan Bradshaw, Plaintiff,
ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant,
OPINION AND ORDER
Terence C. Kern, United States District Judge.
the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Armor
Correctional Health Services, Inc. (“Armor”).
Doc. 18. Armor seeks dismissal of the Second Amended
Complaint filed by Plaintiff Anji Bradshaw. Plaintiff opposes
the motion. Doc. 30.
lawsuit arises from the March 13, 2016, death of
Plaintiff's 19-year-old son, Nathan Bradshaw
(“Bradshaw”), who committed suicide while
incarcerated at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center
(“DLM”)-also known as the Tulsa County Jail.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, Plaintiff asserts federal claims of
“conditions of confinement entity” and
“conditions of confinement respondeat
superior” against Armor based on the alleged
deliberate indifference of Armor and its employees or agents.
Doc. 16 at 16. Plaintiff also asserts Oklahoma state law
claims of negligence, wrongful death and
“survival” against Armor, and she seeks actual
and punitive damages. Id. at 18-19. Armor moved to
dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. P.
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court
must determine whether the claimant has stated a claim upon
which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is properly
granted when a complaint provides no more than “labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must
contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its fact, ” and the factual allegations
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the
allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 562.
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, “a
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555
(internal quotations omitted). For the purpose of making the
dismissal determination, a court must accept as true all the
well-pleaded allegations, even if doubtful in fact, and must
construct the allegations in the light most favorable to the
claimant. Id. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV,
L.L.C., 493 F.3d 120, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Moffett
v. Haliburton energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231
(10th Cir. 2002).
Allegations of the Complaint
to a Health Services Agreement (“HSA”), Armor, a
Florida for-profit corporation, contracted with the Tulsa
County Board of County Commissioners to assume Tulsa
County's state and federal law obligation to deliver
mental and medical health care (“Healthcare
Services”) at the DLM. Doc. 16, Second Amended Petition
at 2. Plaintiff alleges that Armor is liable under state law
for the actions of its agents and employees at DLM under a
theory of respondeat superior consistent with common
law principles set forth by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Baker v. Saint Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 601 (Okla.
2005). Id. at 2-3. She contends that, as a private
corporation, Armor is not entitled to any exemption from
liability set forth in the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims
Act (“GTCA”), 51 O.S. §151 et seq.
Id. at 3.
has a business model that generates revenue through
government contracts premised on “capitated financing,
” or “full-risk” contracts. Id. at
4. Under this approach, the contractor bears the full risk
that the medical care costs may exceed the presumptive
cost-per-prisoner estimate that dictates the agreed-upon
contract price. Id. Assumptions regarding adequate
staffing, costs for medication and other relevant variables
are all factored into the medical-cost-per-prisoner amount
that serves as the basis for the pricing of the contract, and
the contractor agrees to receive a fixed sum of money,
regardless of how much or how little care it ultimately must
provide to prisoners in performing the contract. As a result,
the contractor's profit margin directly depends upon the
amount of care it provides. Id. To achieve net
profits, Armor implements policies, procedures, customs, or
practices to reduce the cost of healthcare services in a
manner that will maintain or increase its profit margin.
Id. at 5. There are no provisions in Armor's
contract with Tulsa County creating or establishing any
mandatory minimum expenditure for the provision of healthcare
alleges that board members of Armor, in furtherance of its
capitated financing contract, adopted written policies or
unwritten practices dictating that care was provided based on
medical cost and not medical need. Id. at 14. This
practice, which “evinces deliberate indifference by
displacing constitutional obligations in favor of corporate
profits, ” includes:
• chronic reliance on lower-level providers
e.g., practical nurses instead of nurses or
physicians, to make threshold decisions regarding care or
• chronic reliance on temporary staff who lack training
or experience in a correction setting, to fill medical
• chronic understaffing that impairs the ability of
existing staff to complete contracted tasks in a timely
• chronic understaffing the prevents Armor from timely
responding to inmate requests for mental health care;
• absence of accountability in the administration of
physician prescribed medication;
• longstanding tolerance for routine lapses in
continuity of care in the administration of medication;
• tolerance of physicians' use of alcohol withdrawal
protocols (CIWA) for arrestees detoxing from opioid use
instead of opioid withdrawal protocols (COWS); and
• chronic failure to correct known deficiencies in the
delivery of adequate healthcare service which were previously
identified to Armor by governmental partners ...