United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendant Jeffrey Dan Williams' pro
se Request for Early Termination of Supervised Release
[Doc. No. 4]. Defendant seeks relief from a term of
supervised release imposed on January 27, 2016, and which he
began serving immediately thereafter. The term will otherwise
expire January 27, 2021. The government has filed a Response
[Doc. No. 9] and Defendant has replied [Doc. No. 10].
18, 1998, in the Northern District of Oklahoma, Defendant
entered a plea of guilty to: one count of Conspiracy to
Manufacture and Distribute a Controlled Substance in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1)(A); two
counts of Possession with Intent to Distribute
Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B); and one count of knowingly
carrying a firearm during drug trafficking in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). On August 31, 1998, Defendant filed a
Motion to Withdraw his plea which was denied. Thereafter,
Defendant was sentenced to 360 months on the conspiracy and
drug charges and 60 months of consecutive imprisonment for
the firearm charge.
engaged in a fourteen-year effort to challenge his
convictions in the district court and Tenth Circuit. See
United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th
Cir. 2015). Eventually, Defendant's convictions were
overturned on April 18, 2014, in response to his Motion to
Withdraw and Nullify Guilty Plea. In overturning these
convictions, the district court concluded:
The facts of this case clearly establish this Court properly
and liberally construed Williams' pleading as a fraud
upon the court motion. The Court further finds the scheme to
manufacture evidence was deliberately planned, carefully
executed and intended to defraud this Court, and in fact,
this Court did rely upon the fraudulently manufactured
evidence in order to convict and sentence Williams. As a
result of such fraud upon the court, the conviction,
sentencing and judgment in Williams' criminal conviction
was not, in essence, a decision at all and never became
final. This Court finds the fraud discussed herein did harm
the “integrity of the judicial process” and the
actions of officers and agents harmed the integrity of the
judicial process. Finally, Williams has provided newly
discovered evidence that satisfies the miscarriage of justice
actual innocence standard. Therefore, this Court has both the
duty and the power to vacate its own prior judgment.
Accordingly, the Court vacates Defendant's judgment and
sentence and dismisses the Indictments.
United States v. Williams, 16 F.Supp.3d 1301,
1315-16 (N.D. Okla. 2014), rev'd and
remanded, United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1059
(10th Cir. 2015). Defendant was released from custody.
government appealed, arguing only that “the district
court lacked jurisdiction over [Defendant's] motion due
to his failure to first obtain certification from [the Tenth
Circuit], as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255, permitting
him to file a second or successive petition for habeas corpus
relief.” United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d
1059, 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 2015). The Tenth Circuit
construed Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Nullify
Guilty Plea as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition
and reversed the district court's determination.
Williams, 790 F.3d at 1069. The Tenth Circuit held
that because Defendant's motion “filed in the
district court is a second or successive petition, the
district court lacked the jurisdiction under § 2255(h)
to act on it in the absence of certification from this
court.” Id. at 1073. “[A]lthough courts
have the inherent authority to correct fraud on the court or
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, AEDPA has limited a
court's ability to exercise those inherent powers when
the court is acting on a second or successive petition for
habeas relief.” Id. at 1067, 1076.
the Tenth Circuit noted that a district court retains the
authority to correct fraud on the Court sua sponte
even where a § 2255 motion has been filed so long as the
court is not acting on that motion in so doing. Id.
at 1070. In Defendant's case, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the “district court acted on
[Defendant's] successive application for habeas relief
because the district court considered the new claims and
evidence raised in Mr. Williams's Motion” and,
therefore had not acted sua sponte.
Williams, 790 F.3d at 1075. The Tenth Circuit
construed Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Nullify
Guilty Plea as a request to file a successive § 2255
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court in that
Defendant had “made a prima facie showing of
factual innocence with respect to his firearm
conviction” but not the drug related charges.
Id. at 1079-1080. Regarding the drug related
charges, the Tenth Circuit reversed because the district
court considered his “claims through the lens of the
common law miscarriage of justice exception, which required
the petitioner to establish actual innocence only by a
preponderance of the evidence. But to obtain authorization to
file a successive petition under AEDPA's framework,
[Defendant] must establish actual innocence by clear and
convincing evidence.” Williams, 790 F.3d at
1080. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
determination as to the drug charges but granted Defendant
authorization to file with the district court a successive 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence as to the
self-surrendered to the Bureau of Prisons on September 15,
2015. On November 13, 2015, the District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma granted Defendant's 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion and vacated his conviction as to
the firearm charge. On January 27, 2016, the district court
sentenced Defendant to time served and a term of supervised
release of five years as to each of the drug related charges
to run concurrently. Defendant was subsequently released from
custody after having served seventeen (17) years.
the date of this Order, Defendant has been on supervised
release for approximately three years and five months.
Defendant asks the Court to terminate his supervised release
about one and a half years prior to its scheduled completion.
In support of his request, Defendant states that he has been
compliant in all areas of his supervision. The government and
the Probation Office oppose Defendant's request.
to grant a motion to terminate a term of supervised release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) is a matter of sentencing
court discretion.” Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676
F.3d 931, ...