United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
ORDER
STEPHEN P. FRIOT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner
Ezekiel Holbert seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, challenging the constitutionality of his state court
conviction.[1] Petitioner appears pro se and his
pleadings are liberally construed.
On
April 29, 2019, Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin entered a
Report and Recommendation (the Report, doc. no. 14),
recommending the court deny Mr. Holbert's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner
filed an objection to the Report. Doc. no. 19. As required by
28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), the court has reviewed the Report
in its entirety and has reviewed all objected to matters
de novo.
In his
first objection, which relates to petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner argues
the Magistrate Judge should have liberally construed his
claim as an attack on the actions of counsel generally rather
than as a direct attack against counsel based solely on
counsel's alleged failure to follow ABA guidelines.
Petitioner argues the magistrate judge erred by not applying
the correct standard applicable to pro se pleadings,
which should be liberally construed to do substantial
justice. Petitioner argues the magistrate judge did not apply
the rule of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972),
as construed in Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991). (Bellmon cites
Haines for the rule that “A pro se
litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers”). The court rejects the arguments
made within the first objection to the Report. Although the
Report does not cite Haines or Hall and
does not specifically address the liberal standards
applicable to pro se pleadings, it is apparent from
the analysis contained within the Report that the magistrate
judge applied the correct standard. Furthermore, the
undersigned has liberally construed petitioner's
pleadings to do substantial justice. Having done so, the
court agrees with the result recommended in the Report.
In his
second objection petitioner argues the magistrate judge
failed to adequately analyze petitioner's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner argues the magistrate
judge concluded that this claim failed solely because the ABA
guidelines are not a basis for habeas relief. The Report,
however, does not reject petitioner's ineffective
assistance claim solely on the ground that petitioner relied
on ABA guidelines. The second objection also contends the
magistrate judge made no attempt to apply Strickland v.
Washington[2] to the ineffective assistance claim, and
asks that the reasonableness of his counsel's actions be
analyzed. The Report applies Strickland to the
challenged conduct of petitioner's counsel. Moreover, the
undersigned finds and concludes that counsel's challenged
conduct was reasonable in the circumstances. Petitioner has
identified no acts or omissions of counsel that were not the
result of reasonable professional judgment. Petitioner's
arguments made within the second objection are rejected.
In his
third objection petitioner argues the magistrate judge failed
to analyze his claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty
by his sister, who threatened to have him killed if he went
to trial. Petitioner argues the magistrate judge erred by
recommending denial of relief based on the fact that the
government was not a party to this threat. He also contends
the magistrate judge erred by relying on Miles v.
Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995),
which is distinguishable. Petitioner argues that to deny this
claim because government involvement cannot be proved would
open a door for a prosecutor to use a third person to
violently intimidate a defendant into a plea of guilt. The
court rejects these arguments. The magistrate judge analyzed
all aspects of petitioner's argument that he was coerced
into entering a guilty plea, including but not limited to
petitioner's argument about the threat made by his
sister. The magistrate judge did not err by citing
Miles, including for the proposition that
“[F]amily[] urgings do not implicate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the influence did
not come from the court or the government.”
Miles, 61 F.3d at 1470.
Having
conducted de novo review of all of petitioner's
objections (whether or not separately addressed in this
order), the court rejects petitioner's objections and
states that it agrees with the result stated in the Report.
Petitioner's objections to the Report are
DENIED. Doc. no. 19. The Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is
ACCEPTED, ADOPTED and
AFFIRMED. Doc. no 14. In accordance with the
Report, the petition for habeas relief is
DENIED.
Movant
is entitled to a certificate of appealability only upon
making a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This
standard is satisfied by demonstrating that the issues movant
seeks to raise are deserving of further proceedings,
debatable among jurists of reasons, or subject to different
resolution on appeal. See, Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“[W]e give the language found in
§2253(c) the meaning ascribed it in [Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)], with due note for
the substitution of the word
‘constitutional.'”). “Where a district
court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits,
...[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id.
Petitioner has not made the requisite showing and a
certificate of appealability is
DENIED
IT IS
ORDERED.
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Notes:
[1] As stated in the Report and
Recommendation (doc. no. 14, p. 2), Mr. Holbert entered a
guilty plea on two counts of first-degree murder and three
counts of shooting with intent to kill. He entered a plea of
nolo contendere on a ...