United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
LAWANNA McCLEARY O/B/O A.T.M. minor, Plaintiff,
ANDREW M. SAUL,  Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
H. MCCARTHY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration denying Social Security disability
benefits is sought in this action. The matter has been referred
to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report
role of the court in reviewing the decision of the
Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to a
determination of whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the
correct legal standards were applied. See Briggs ex rel.
Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir.
2001); Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir.
1996); Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance,
and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28
L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court may neither
reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of
the Commissioner. Casias v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Even
if the court would have reached a different conclusion, if
supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's
decision stands. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1992).
was 13 years old at the time of the alleged onset of
disability and 16 years old on the date of the ALJ's
denial decision. He claims to have been disabled since March
1, 2014 as a result of asthma, allergic rhinitis, depression,
anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).
Evaluation for Child's Disability Benefits
procedures for evaluating disability for children are set out
at 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). The first step is to
determine whether the child is performing substantial gainful
activity. If not, the next consideration is whether the child
has a “severe” mental or physical impairment. A
“severe” impairment is one that causes more than
minimal functional limitations. If a “severe”
impairment is identified, the claim is reviewed to determine
whether the child has an impairment that: 1) meets, medically
equals, or functionally equals the listings of impairments
for children; and 2) meets the duration requirement.
child does not have impairments of a severity to meet a
listing, the severity of the limitations imposed by
impairments are analyzed to determine whether they
functionally equal a listing. Six broad areas of functioning,
called domains, are considered to assess what a child can and
cannot do. Impairments functionally equal a listing when the
impairments result in “marked” limitations in two
domains or an “extreme” limitation in one domain.
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a. The six domains are: 1) acquiring
and using information; 2) attending and completing tasks; 3)
interacting and relating with others; 4) moving about and
manipulating objects; 5) caring for yourself; and 6) health
and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). A
limitation is “marked” when it interferes
seriously with the ability to independently initiate,
sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(e)(2)(I). An “extreme” limitation
interferes very seriously with the ability to independently
initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. §
determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a
combination of impairments that meet or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments. The ALJ also
determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that functionally equals the
severity of the listings. In this regard the ALJ found that
Plaintiff has less than marked limitation in the domain of
acquiring and using information; he has less than marked
limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks,
he has a marked limitation in the domain of interacting and
relating with others, no limitation in the domain of moving
about and manipulating objects, less than marked limitation
in the domain of the ability to care for himself, and less
than marked limitation in the domain of health and physical
well-being. Since Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that result in either
“marked” limitation in two domains of functioning
or an “extreme” limitation in one domain of
functioning, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not been
disabled as that term is defined in the Social Security Act
since October 30, 2014, the date the application for benefits
asserts that the ALJ did not properly consider all of his
impairments and that the ALJ improperly ...