United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
TA'SHAWN R. WILSON, Petitioner,
SCOTT CROW, Interim Director,  Respondent.
CHARLES B. GOODWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ta'Shawn R. Wilson, a state prisoner, filed this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking habeas relief. The
matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Bernard M. Jones for
initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and (C). Following the filing of
Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(“Amended Petition, ” Doc. No. 27), Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 33), seeking dismissal of
this action as time barred. Following Petitioner's
Response (Doc. No. 35), Judge Jones issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R. & R., ” Doc. No. 36)
recommending that the Motion be granted.
through his counsel, has filed a timely written Objection
(Doc. No. 37). Thus, the Court must make a de novo
determination of portions of the R. & R. to which a
specific objection has been made, and the Court may accept,
modify, or reject the recommended decision in whole or in
part. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.
April 2, 2008, Petitioner entered a blind guilty plea to
several drug-related crimes in the District Court of Oklahoma
County, Oklahoma. On September 17, 2008, the state court
ordered that entry of Petitioner's sentences would be
deferred for five years. In April 2010, the State applied to
accelerate Petitioner's sentences, and on June 29, 2010,
the trial court imposed multiple sentences against
Petitioner. Petitioner then filed an appeal and otherwise
sought relief in the state trial and appellate courts but was
unsuccessful. He filed this habeas action on April 23, 2018,
and asserts that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and
voluntarily entered because he was “not fairly apprised
on the consequences” of his guilty plea. Am. Pet. at
novo review of the record, the Court concurs with Judge
Jones' suggested disposition of this matter. The Amended
Petition is subject to the one-year statute of limitations
established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). Judge Jones reviewed the timeliness of the
Amended Petition under subsections § 2244(d)(1)(A) and
(d)(1)(D) and found that (i) the Amended Petition was
untimely filed under the former provision, even allowing for
statutory tolling, and (ii) Petitioner's argument for
application of the latter provision was meritless.
Petitioner's Objection does not challenge either of these
Jones further found that Petitioner was not entitled to
equitable tolling. In his Objection, Petitioner argues that
the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and
“if there [i]s a time bar, ” it can be
In Murphy v. Royal, [866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir.
2017)], the Petitioner's claims were time barred while
the State Court addressed the merits of those claims, it
unreasonably determined Supreme Court precedent that overcame
the AEDPA's statute of limitations. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (explaining that when a
state-court decision falls within the “contrary
to” clause, “a federal court will be
unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1)”).
Pet'r's Obj. at 3 (citation omitted).
argument is confusing and “disingenuous at best.”
R. & R. at 3. As a threshold matter, Petitioner's
habeas counsel characterizes Murphy as current
authority without noting that the cited decision was amended
and superseded by the appellate court in 2017. See Murphy
v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert.
granted sub nom. Royal v. Murphy, 138 S.Ct. 2026 (2018).
Second, neither the original nor the amended Murphy
decision addresses the timeliness of federal habeas petitions
or AEDPA's one-year deadline. And third, nowhere in the
Murphy decisions or in Williams is there a
holding to the effect that an unreasonable determination of
the state court “overc[omes] the AEDPA statute of
limitations.” Pet'r's Obj. at 3. The reference
to § 2254(d)(1) in the cited portion of
Williams has nothing to do with §
2244(d)(1) and does not authorize the Court to
disregard the untimely nature of Petitioner's filing.
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406.
remainder of Petitioner's Objection essentially argues
that the Court should consider the Amended Petition because
Petitioner's state-court guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary. This focus on the merits of the habeas claim does
not demonstrate any error in Judge Jones' well-reasoned
R. & R. and does not provide the undersigned any basis
upon which to reject the recommendation therein.
the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 36) is ADOPTED in its
entirety, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 33) is
GRANTED, and the Amended Petition (Doc. No. 27) is DISMISSED
without prejudice as untimely filed.
to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts, the Court must issue or
deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) when
it enters a final order adverse to a petitioner. A COA may
issue only upon “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
“When the district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's
underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Upon
consideration, the Court finds the requisite standard is not
met in this case. Therefore, a COA is denied.