United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
ORDER
DAVID
L. RUSSELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before
the Court is the pro se petition for habeas corpus
filed by Petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the
Eastern District of Missouri and transferred to this Court on
August 12, 2019 because Mr. Sauceda is incarcerated in this
judicial district. (Doc. No. 3). Upon consideration of the
motion pursuant to its screening obligation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to
grant the relief requested, and the motion is therefore
dismissed. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts (applicable to
§ 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)).[1]
Petitioner
is serving a 108-month sentence imposed by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on
January 13, 2016, after pleading guilty to a single count of
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. The primary argument in the
Petition is a request for a reduced sentence on compassionate
grounds, given that Mr. Sauceda is 63 years old, serving time
for a non- violent felony, and has completed more than
one-half of his sentence. (Doc. No. 1, p. 6). Petitioner
inquires whether he is eligible for relief under the new 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f), a sentencing provision. (Doc. No. 1,
p. 7). In Ground Three, Petitioner seeks the benefit of
Section 402 of the First Step Act. (Doc. No. 1, p. 7). This
claim is identical to Ground Two, because Section 402 is the
provision broadening the safety valve amendments to §
3553(f). In Ground Four, Mr. Sauceda seeks a reduction of his
sentence in light of Amendment 802 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. (Doc. No. 1, p. 8).
The
Court concludes it may not consider Grounds Two through Four,
which must be pursued by Petitioner in his criminal case in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.[2]
[T]he motion is due to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
because that issue “must be considered by the
sentencing court, ” which is the Middle District of
Florida. Bruno v. Stone, No. 315-002, 2015 WL
1893348, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 15, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted May 11, 2015, 2015 WL 2227672;
Gregory v. Grondolsky, 365 Fed.Appx. 326, 327 (3rd
Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's dismissal of
habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction and holding a §
2255 motion or “motion to reduce sentence pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582 filed with the sentencing court”
would be the petitioner's only potential avenue for
relief); Pinkley v. Anderson, No. 06-246, 2006 WL
2671074, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2006) (transferring
request for § 3582(c)(1)(B) sentence modification to the
Western District of Tennessee, which imposed the
petitioner's sentence).
Wilson v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-229-KOB-SGC,
2018 WL 6006959, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6001637 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 15,
2018); see also Braswell v. Gallegos, 82 Fed.Appx.
633, 635 (10th Cir. 2003)(“Because a motion filed under
§ 3582 requests modification of a sentence, it follows
that such a motion must be filed in the district court which
imposed the sentence.”); Landazuri v. Hall,
423 Fed.Appx. 475, 476(5th Cir. 2011) (“Because
Landazuri did not file this [3582(c)] challenge to
his sentence in the court in which he was sentenced, the
district court ruled correctly that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider it”).
With
regard to Petitioner's request for compassionate release,
wherein he cites his age, 63, and the non-violent nature of
his conviction, the Court presumes Petitioner seeks
participation in the “Elderly Offender Program”
under the First Step Act of 2018. The First Step Act
reauthorized the Elderly Offender Home Detention Program.
Eligibility criteria include that the offender must be 60
years of age or older, and must have served more than
two-thirds of his sentence. 34 U.S.C. §
60541(g).[3] Other criteria apply regarding the nature
of the crime for which the offender was convicted and his
criminal history. As relevant to the outcome herein, 34
U.S.C. § 60541(g)(1)(B) provides:
In carrying out the pilot program as described in
subparagraph (A), the Attorney General may release
some or all eligible elderly offenders . . . from Bureau of
Prisons facilities to home detention, upon written request
from either the Bureau of Prisons or an eligible elderly
offender. . . .
Id.
[T]he Supreme Court has consistently held that a prisoner has
no constitutional right to confinement in any particular
place, including in-home confinement. See McKune v.
Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled
that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of
prison administrators' expertise.”); Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause did not itself create a liberty interest in
prisoners to be free from intrastate prison
transfers.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
224 (1976) (“The conviction has sufficiently
extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower
the State to confine him in any of its prisons.”). The
Attorney General-and by delegation the BOP-has the exclusive
authority and discretion to designate the place of an
inmate's confinement. Moore v. United States
Att'y Gen., 473 F.2d 1375, 1376 (5th Cir. 1973);
Ledesma v. United States, 445 F.2d 1323, 1324 (5th
Cir. 1971). And in this case, the EOHDP is a pilot project,
and the Attorney General retains the discretion to designate
the institutions which will participate. “[A]ny
approach that puts the judicial branch in charge of
designating the place of confinement for a federal
prisoner-no matter how well justified on utilitarian
grounds-collides with 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b), which gives
the Attorney General unfettered discretion to decide where to
house federal prisoners.” In re Gee, 815 F.2d
41, 42 (7th Cir. 1987).
Zheng Yi Xiao v. La Tuna Fed. Corr. Inst., No.
EP-19-CV-97-KC, 2019 WL 1472889, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3,
2019). In light of this discretion, Petitioner has not
established that he is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). See United States v.
Tikal, No. 12-cr-000362-TLN-KJN, 2019 WL 3035557, at *4
(E.D. Cal. July 11, 2019)(“statute merely grants the
Attorney General discretion to release eligible elderly
offenders.”); United States v. Perez-Asencio,
No. 18CR3611-H, 2019 WL 626175, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14,
2019) (“Title 18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) only
permits courts to modify an imposed term of imprisonment, not
the method of incarceration and Title 34 U.S.C. § 60541
only authorizes the Attorney General, not the courts, to
modify the method of imprisonment from a BOP facility to home
confinement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon
consideration of the petition herein, the Court hereby
dismisses the petition because the Court lacks the authority
to modify Mr. Sauceda's sentence as requested in Ground
One and the sentencing court, that is, the Eastern District
of Missouri, is the only court with jurisdiction to modify
his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3582. Petitioner
has failed to establish he is incarcerated in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
IT IS
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