SHAWN A. DETWILER, Petitioner
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent.
K. HAMPTON HAMPTON LAW OFFICE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
RESPONSE FROM THE STATE
OPINION DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Before the Court is Petitioner Shawn A. Detwiler's
application for post-conviction relief, appealing the
Garfield County District Court's denial of
post-conviction relief in the following cases:
CF-1996-244: Count 1--Burglary in the Second Degree; Count
2--Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property; and Counts 3 and
4--Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle. Petitioner pled
guilty to all four counts and was sentenced to five years
imprisonment on each count. All counts were ordered to be
served concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal these
convictions. The sentences for this case were discharged on
September 23, 2001.
CF-1996-422: Count 1--Robbery with an Imitation Firearm.
Petitioner was tried and convicted at a jury trial and
sentenced to forty-six years imprisonment. This Court
affirmed the Judgment and Sentence in Detwiler v.
State, Case No. F-1997-1513 (Okl.Cr., Dec. 11, 1998)
CF-1996-423: Count 1--Robbery with a Firearm; and Count
2--Shooting with Intent to Kill. Petitioner was tried and
convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to eighty-seven years
imprisonment on Count 1, and life imprisonment on Count 2.
Both counts were ordered to run consecutively with each other
and with CF-1996-422. This Court affirmed the Judgments and
Sentences in Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1998-340
(Okl.Cr., Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished). The District Court
denied Petitioner's request for sentence modification on
April 12, 2006.
CF-1996-482: Count 1--Assault and/or Battery with a Dangerous
Weapon; and Count 2--Escape from Confinement. Petitioner pled
guilty to both counts and was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment on Count 1, and three years imprisonment on
Count 2. The two counts were ordered to be served
concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal these convictions.
Petitioner's Count 2 sentence was discharged on January
28, 2000. His Count 1 sentence was discharged on October 14,
Notably, Petitioner's crimes in each of these cases
occurred prior to the enactment of Section 13.1 of Title 21,
which requires persons convicted of certain enumerated
crimes, including crimes committed by Petitioner, to serve
not less than 85% of his or her sentence prior to becoming
eligible for consideration for parole. Thus, the 85% Rule is
not applicable to any of Petitioner's sentences
Petitioner argued to the court below that his sentences in
the aggregate for crimes he committed as a juvenile violate
the United States Constitution's Eighth Amendment as
construed in Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d
956, and are subject to collateral attack. In an order filed
June 15, 2018, the Honorable Tom L. Newby, Associate District
Judge, denied Petitioner's post-conviction application
finding Miller,  Montgomery  and
Luna do not apply to Petitioner's case because
he was not sentenced to life without parole or any functional
equivalent. Judge Newby further found Petitioner is presently
eligible for parole consideration, has previously been
considered for parole, and will again be eligible for review.
On appeal, Petitioner contends the District Court in
analyzing his claims failed to appropriately view his
sentences from his separate cases collectively as a de
facto life without parole sentence. He thus argues that
the District Court's denial of his application was an
unreasonable determination under Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010),
Miller, and Montgomery. To support his
claim, Petitioner relies heavily on the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th
Cir. 2017), cert denied, Byrd v. Budder,
___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 475, 199 L.Ed.2d 374 (2017). In
Budder, the Tenth Circuit interpreted
Graham and its progeny as applying to "all
juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide, and [ ]
prohibit[ing]... all sentences that would deny such offenders
a realistic opportunity to obtain release" within their
lifetime, Id. at 1053, "whether or not that
sentence bears the specific label 'life without
parole.'" Id. at 1057. Thus, based on this
interpretation, the Budder court viewed the juvenile
defendant's sentences for four non-homicide offenses in
the aggregate as though they were one.
This Court recently addressed the Budder decision in
Martinez v. State, 2019 OK CR 7, 442 P.3d 154.
Noting this Court's "independent duty and authority
to interpret decisions of the United States Supreme Court[,
]" we disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's
determination that it is "clearly established [law] that
Graham applied to offenders with multiple crimes and
multiple charges." Martinez, 2019 OK CR 7,
¶ 5, 442 P.3d 154, 155-56 (citing Budder, 851
F.3d at 1057).  We further observed that while
Budder involved non-homicide offenses,
Martinez's multiple crimes included first degree murder.
Id., 2019 OK CR 7, ¶ 6, 442 P.3d at 156.
Notwithstanding this distinction, the Court held "that
where multiple sentences have been imposed, each sentence
should be analyzed separately to determine whether it
comports with the Eighth Amendment under the Graham
/ Miller / Montgomery trilogy of cases,
rather than considering the cumulative effect of all
sentences imposed upon a given defendant." Id.
In reaching this determination, this Court observed that
"even after Graham, Miller, and
Montgomery, [juvenile] 'defendants convicted of
multiple offenses are not entitled to a "volume
discount" on their aggregate sentence.'"
Id. at ¶ 6 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Foust, 2018 Pa. Super. 39, 180 A.3d 416, 434 (2018)).
We likewise reach the same determination today. While
Petitioner's multiple crimes, like Budder, are
non-homicide offenses, this corresponding factor does not
frustrate or cause this Court to vary its interpretation in
Martinez of Graham and its progeny. The
Supreme Court has not explicitly held that stacked sentences
imposed in a juvenile case--whether homicide or
non-homicide--should be reviewed in the aggregate when
conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis. Moreover, Petitioner
here asks this Court to go a step further and review his
sentences from his multiple and unrelated cases in the
aggregate.  This request is clearly beyond the
bounds of the current law . We thus find, as we did
in Martinez, that the Eighth Amendment analysis
focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not
on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes. To do
otherwise would effectively give crimes away. See
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331, 12 S.Ct. 693,
696-97, 36 L.Ed. 450 (1892) (observing that "[i]f the
penalty were unreasonably severe for a single offense, the
constitutional question might be urged; but here the
unreasonableness is only in the number of offenses which the
respondent has committed.").
Graham, the applicable case in this matter, held a
juvenile offender "may not be sentenced to life
without parole for a nonhomicide crime."
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75, 130 S.Ct. at ...