Nos. 2:16-CV-00351-TC & 2:00-CR-00562-TC-1) (D. Utah)
HOLMES, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
issue in this appeal involves the timeliness of Mr. Mesa
Rith's motion to vacate his sentence. The district court
dismissed the motion on the ground that the limitations
period had expired. Mr. Rith wants to appeal; to do so, he
requests a certificate of appealability and initial
consideration en banc. We deny the request for a certificate,
dismiss the appeal, and deny the request for initial
consideration en banc as moot because absent the grant of a
certificate we do not have jurisdiction over the merits of
Rith committed the offense in 2000; at that time, the United
States Sentencing Guidelines were considered mandatory.
See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.
129, 133 (1991), abrogated on other grounds, Dillon v.
United States, 560 U.S. 817, 820-21 (2010).
These guidelines treated an offense as a crime of violence if
the offense created "a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another." USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2)
(2000). (This provision is commonly known as the
guidelines are now considered advisory rather than mandatory.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237-39
(2005). After they became advisory, the Supreme Court
rejected a vagueness challenge to the guidelines'
residual clause. Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct.
886, 890, 892, 894-95 (2017). But the Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed a vagueness challenge to the guidelines
when they were considered mandatory. See id. at 903
n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Rith contends that given the mandatory nature of the
guidelines in 2000, their residual clause should be subject
to a vagueness challenge. For this contention, Mr. Rith
likens the guidelines' residual clause to an identical
statutory clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)), which was struck down in
Johnson v. United States as unconstitutionally
vague. 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
raise this contention on appeal, Mr. Rith needs a certificate
of appealability. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003). This certificate is available only if Mr.
Rith shows that reasonable jurists could debate the
correctness of the district court's ruling. Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). We conclude that
Mr. Rith has not made this showing.
motion to vacate the sentence is ordinarily due one year from
when the judgment became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).
An exception exists when the defendant relies on a new rule
of constitutional law that has been deemed retroactive to
cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3). Mr. Rith
invokes this exception here based on Johnson. Though
Johnson did not address the sentencing guidelines,
our later opinion in United States v. Greer did,
holding that Johnson had not set out a new
constitutional rule applicable to the guide lines when they
were considered mandatory. 88 1 F.3d 1241, 1247-49 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 139 S.Ct. 374 (2018).
defendant argues that Greer was abrogated by
Sessions v. Dimaya. In Dimaya, the Supreme
Court applied Johnson to the definition of a
"crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1213-16 (2018).
But after the Supreme Court decided Sessions v.
Dimaya, we reiterated in United States v.
Pullen that Johns on had not created a new rule
of constitutional law applicable to the mandatory guidelines.
United States v. Pullen, 913 F.3d 1270, 1284 n.17
(10th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
July 17, 2019) (No. 19-5219). So Dimaya does not
allow Mr. Rith to invoke § 2255(f)(3) based on
our decisions in Greer and Pullen, we start
the one-year period of limitations from the date on which the
conviction became final, not from the date on which
Johnson was decided. Applying this limitations
period, any reasonable jurist would conclude that Mr.
Rith's motion to vacate was untimely.
Rith's sentence became final in 2003. United States
v. Rith, 63 Fed.Appx. 463, 464-65 (2003) (unpublished).
He then had one year to move to vacate his sentence; but he
waited roughly thirteen years, missing the limitations period
by about twelve years. Because Mr. Rith's motion was
indisputably untimely, we (1) decline to issue a certificate
of appealability, (2) dismiss the appeal, and (3) deny the
request for initial consideration en banc as moot because
absent the grant of a certificate we do not have jurisdiction
over the merits of this appeal.
Bacharach, J., dissenting.
with the majority that Mr. Rith's claim fails under
Greer and Pullen. But I believe that Mr.
Rith has satisfied the low ...