BRANDE L. SAMUELS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
STATE OF OKLAHOMA; OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION CITY OF TULSA; TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE; TULSA COUNTY INVESTIGATOR; TULSA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS; G T BYNUM; CLAIRE V. EAGAN; SHARON ELAIN ALLEN HOLMES; JAMES KEELY; STEVE KUNZWEILER; ISSAC SHIELDS; CHUCK JORDAN; DAVID BEEN; RONALD PALMER; MIKE WILLIAMS; JERROD HART; TIMOTHY MEANS; RICHARD ASCHOFF; RUSTY BROWN; CLARK E. WILLIAMS; LARRY L. EDWARDS; STEVEN T. NIEMITALO; DONALD R. CHANDLER; RUFUS E. NEWSOME; STEVEN L. SANDERS; DOUGLAS K. SCHULKE; JAYE W. TAYLOR; CORBIN CLARK BREWSTER; BRIAN JAMES RAYL; STEWART SOUTHERLAND; ROBERT NIGH; KIMBERLY HAYS; CHARLES W. CHESTNUT; RICHARD STEVENS; JOHN W. COYLE III; KALEB K. HENNIGH; JAMES L. KEE; D. KENYON WILLIAMS JR.; MATTHEW C. BEESE; JIMMY D. OLIVER; BRYON J. WILL; JAMES R. HICKS; BRIAN K. MORTON; ALISSA PREBLE HUTTER; NATHAN D. RICHTER; MARK KENNEDY; CITY OF TULSA; TULSA COUNTY JAIL; VICTOR REGALADO; DAVID PARKER; GWENDOLYN BRIGGS, Defendants-Appellees.
Okla. D.C. No. 4:18-CV-00267-EFM-KGG
BRISCOE, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [*]
L. Moritz Circuit Judge
pro se, Brande Samuels brought suit against various
individuals and entities (collectively, the defendants),
alleging they violated his constitutional rights by
"willfully, wantonly, recklessly, and deliberately
subjecting [him] to unlawful arrest, detention[, ] and
prosecution." R. vol. 6, 14 (emphasis
omitted).Samuels also asserted state-law claims for
assault and infliction of emotional distress.
magistrate judge screened the complaint and recommended
dismissing for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A(a)-(b). Specifically, the magistrate judge (1)
recommended dismissing Samuels's claims against certain
defendants because Samuels failed "to include any
[specific] factual allegations" against them, R. vol. 6,
213 (emphasis omitted); (2) recommended dismissing most of
Samuels's claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), because the claims were
barred by the two-year statute of limitations; (3)
recommended dismissing Samuels's state-law tort claims
because they were also time-barred; (4) recommended
dismissing any claims arising from conduct that allegedly
occurred after Samuels submitted his amended
complaint because such conduct necessarily didn't
"occur within the limitations period,"
id. at 218; and (5) recommended dismissing
Samuels's remaining claims for failure to state a claim.
The magistrate judge also denied Samuels's motions for
appointment of counsel.
then filed a flurry of documents, including objections to the
magistrate judge's recommendations, a motion for summary
judgment, a motion to supplement the complaint, a motion to
amend the complaint, a motion to enjoin state-court
proceedings, and a motion to expedite a ruling on the motion
to enjoin. The district court overruled Samuels's
objections to the magistrate judge's recommendations
because (1) Samuels failed to "address the [magistrate
judge's] reasons" for "recommend[ing] dismissal
of his claims" and (2) Samuels's objection to the
magistrate judge's order refusing to appoint counsel was
moot. R. vol. 7, 186. It then denied Samuels's motions to
supplement and amend because Samuels "failed to explain
how he would amend or supplement his complaint, as required
by the local rules, or why [his] attempts to amend or
supplement would not be futile." Id. at 187-
188. Finally, the district court denied Samuels's
remaining motions as moot in light of its decision to adopt
the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
now appeals the district court's order. But much like the
objections he filed in district court-which neither
acknowledged most of the magistrate judge's specific
recommendations nor challenged the reasoning behind
them-Samuels's appellate brief likewise fails to engage
with either the district court's rulings or its
instance, Samuels doesn't dispute that his claims against
certain defendants were subject to dismissal because he
failed "to include any [specific] factual
allegations" against them. R. vol. 6, 213. Likewise, he
doesn't attempt to demonstrate that his motions to amend
or supplement complied with the applicable local rules. Nor
does he dispute that most of his claims were time-barred or
make any effort to refute the district court's reasons
for concluding that his remaining claims failed as a matter
of law. Finally, he doesn't challenge the district
court's conclusion that dismissing his complaint rendered
his remaining motions moot.
to succeed on appeal, an appellant must "explain what
was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied
on in reaching its decision." Nixon v. City &
Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015).
Because Samuels provides no such explanation here, we affirm
the district court's order without further discussion.
See id. at 1369 (summarily affirming district
court's ruling because appellant's "opening
brief contain[ed] nary a word to challenge the basis"
for it). As a final matter, we deny Samuels's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal and his motion to
appoint counsel. See Lister v. Dep't Of
Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting
that "to succeed on a motion to proceed IFP, the movant
must show . . . the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues
raised"); cf. Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d
978, 978-79 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming order denying motion
to appoint because "even with appointed counsel,
[appellant] had little likelihood of prevailing on the
[*] After examining Samuels's brief
and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument wouldn't materially assist
in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment isn't binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value.
See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
 We liberally construe Samuels's
pro se filings. But we won't "assume the role of
[his] advocate." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d