No. 5:17-CV-03019-DDC) (D. Kan.)
McHUGH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT[*]
L. Moritz Circuit Judge.
Howard, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), against several Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
officials and staff members, including Ray Rodgers, Doug
Wettlauffer, Paul Leonhard, Roger Crooks, and Kimberly
Maurelli (collectively, the defendants), alleging they
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, Howard alleged
that Rodgers sexually assaulted him while Howard was
incarcerated at a federal penitentiary, and that Wettlauffer,
Leonhard, Crooks, and Maurelli failed to stop Rodgers.
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Howard
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e. See § 1997e(a) ("No action
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . .
. [f]ederal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility[, ] until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted."). Howard, who
was then represented by counsel, disagreed; he insisted that
he exhausted his administrative remedies by complying with
the directions set forth in the BOP's "Sexual Abuse
Behavior Prevention and Intervention Program." R. vol.
evaluating Howard's response to the defendant's
motion, the district court first noted that Howard failed to
provide specific citations to the relevant parts of the
summary-judgment record, as required by local rule.
See D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b). And based solely on the
facts that were "properly" before it, the district
court determined that Howard failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. R. vol. 1, 199. Thus, the district
court granted the defendants' motion for summary
attorney then withdrew, and Howard filed a pro se motion
under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that Howard
failed to identify "the kind of extraordinary
circumstances required to grant [him] relief" from the
court's order granting summary judgment to the
defendants. Id. at 221-22; see also Cashner v.
Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[A] district court may grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion
only in extraordinary circumstances and only when necessary
to accomplish justice.").
now appeals, arguing the district court erred in granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and in denying
his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. But in doing so, Howard fails to
explain in his opening brief precisely how the
district court allegedly erred. See Nixon v. City &
Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015)
("The first task of an appellant is to explain to us why
the district court's decision was wrong."). For
instance, Howard doesn't (1) dispute that he failed to
provide the requisite citations to the record in his response
to the defendants' motion for summary judgment or (2)
assert the district court erred in concluding that, based on
the facts that were properly before it, Howard failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Nor does Howard
meaningfully engage with the district court's reasons for
denying his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Further, to the extent
Howard's opening brief contains any arguments at all,
Howard fails to support those arguments "with citations
to the authorities and parts of the record on which [he]
relies." Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also
Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840-41 (noting that Rule 28 applies
with equal force to pro se litigants). Accordingly, Howard
has waived any challenge to the district court's rulings.
See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th
Cir. 2007) (noting that we regularly "decline to
consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately
presented, in an appellant's opening brief"). We
therefore affirm the district court's orders granting
summary judgment to the defendants and denying Howard's
Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Nixon, 784 F.3d at 1369
(summarily affirming district court's order dismissing
claim because appellant's brief "contain[ed] nary a
word to challenge the basis of the dismissal").
Howard asks us both to appoint "a lawyer to help
[him]" and to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP) on appeal. Aplt. Br. 4. Although we have authority to
"request an attorney to represent any person unable to
afford counsel," we decline to do so here. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1); cf. Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d
978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's
order denying motion to appoint counsel because "even
with appointed counsel," plaintiff had little chance of
success on the merits). And because Howard fails to
"show . . . the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues
raised" in this appeal, we likewise deny his motion to
proceed IFP. Lister v. Dep't Of Treasury, 408
F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005). Howard remains obligated to
pay the full filing fee.
[*] After examining the briefs and
appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that
oral argument wouldn't materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
isn't binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But
it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
 As we discuss below, Howard was
initially represented by counsel. But he later proceeded pro
se in district court and likewise proceeds pro se on appeal.
Although we liberally construe his pro se filings, we
won't act as his advocate by, e.g., formulating possible
arguments or combing the record for support. See Garrett
v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005).
 Howard named additional defendants in
his initial pleadings, but they are not parties to ...