United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
LYNETTA D. McGREGOR, Plaintiff,
ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SDZANNE MITCHELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
D. McGregor (Plaintiff) brings this action for judicial
review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final
decision that she was not “disabled” under the
Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), 423(d)(1)(A). The parties have consented under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) to proceed before a United States
Magistrate Judge. Docs. 9, 13. Plaintiff argues substantial
evidence does not support the jobs the ALJ identified at step
five of the analysis and that the ALJ should have limited her
residual functional capacity to exclude contact with the
public. Doc. 14, at 3-7. After a careful review of the record
(AR), the parties' briefs, and the relevant authority,
the court affirms the Commissioner's decision.
Social Security Act defines “disability” as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). “This twelve-month duration requirement
applies to the claimant's inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity, and not just h[er] underlying
impairment.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080,
1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212, 218-19 (2002)).
Burden of proof.
“bears the burden of establishing a disability”
and of “ma[king] a prima facie showing that [s]he can
no longer engage in h[er] prior work activity.”
Turner v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir.
1985). If Plaintiff makes that prima facie showing, the
burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to show
Plaintiff retains the capacity to perform a different type of
work and that such a specific type of job exists in the
national economy. Id.
Administrative Law Judge's findings.
assigned to Plaintiff's case applied the standard
regulatory analysis to decide whether Plaintiff was disabled
during the relevant timeframe. AR 15-26; see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4); see
also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir.
2009) (describing the five-step process). The ALJ found
(1) had the following severe impairments: depression,
anxiety, and diabetes;
(2) did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed
(3) had the residual functional capacity for light work
“with nonexertional limitations in that claimant would
be limited to work that is of SVP level 2 or less as defined
in the DOT”; “would have the ability to
understand, remember, and carry out ordinary and/or routine
written or oral instructions and tasks and to set realistic
goals and plans independently of others”; and
“would have the ...