United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
USSAMA A. MANDO, Plaintiff,
ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SUZANNE MITCHELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
A. Mando (Plaintiff) brings this action for judicial review
of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision
that he was not "disabled" under the Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
423(d)(1)(A). The parties have consented under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) to proceed before a United States Magistrate
Judge. Docs. 10, 14.Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's
residual functionality capacity assessment and his treatment
of Plaintiffs subjective statements. Doc. 19, at 13-22. After
a careful review of the record (AR), the parties' briefs,
and the relevant authority, the court reverses the
Commissioner's decision and remands the case for further
review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Social Security Act defines "disability" as the
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). "This twelve-month duration requirement
applies to the claimant's inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity, and not just his underlying
impairment." Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084
(10th Cir. 2007) (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 218-19 (2002)).
Burden of proof.
"bears the burden of establishing a disability" and
of "ma[king] a prima facie showing that he can no longer
engage in his prior work activity." Turner v.
Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1985). If
Plaintiff makes that prima facie showing, the burden of proof
then shifts to the Commissioner to show Plaintiff retains the
capacity to perform a different type of work and that such a
specific type of job exists in the national economy.
Administrative Law Judge's findings.
assigned to Plaintiffs case applied the standard regulatory
analysis to decide whether Plaintiff was disabled during the
relevant timeframe. AR 12-26; see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4); see also Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d
1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the five-step
process). The ALJ found Plaintiff:
(1) had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc
disease of the cervical spine; degenerative disc disease of
the lumbar spine; diabetes mellitus type 2; depression; and
(2) did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed
(3) had the residual functional capacity for light work
except he could only stand/walk up to six hours in an eight
hour day, could sit up to six hours in an eight hour day,
could no more than frequently stoop or climb ramps/stairs,
could no more than occasionally crawl or climb
ladders/ropes/scaffolds, and could perform and follow simple
and detailed tasks and instructions;
(4) could not perform his past relevant work as a restaurant
manager or cook as Plaintiff had actually or generally
(5) could perform jobs that exist in substantial numbers in
the national economy, such as lunch cook, short order cook,
and cafeteria/food service worker; and thus
(6) had not been under a disability as defined by the Social
Security Act from May 10, 2015 through December 28, 2017.